American–Hungarian Relations,
1900-1918

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The study of American-Hungarian relations during the first two decades of the twentieth century has largely been neglected by Hungarian, Hungarian-American and American historians alike. Arguably the most important reason for this lies in the fact that there was no independent Hungary at the time. Thus, any study of American-Hungarian relations must be pursued with an ever narrowing focus, and this is indeed what the present paper proposes to do. Accordingly, a survey of relations between the United States and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary will be followed by a review of American-Hungarian relations. Finally, a particular case study, Count Albert Apponyi's relations with America, certain prominent Americans, and the Hungarian-Americans, will be offered. And by way of conclusion the mutual images of the two nations will be summed up.

The highest level: The United States and Austria-Hungary

Relations between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I were largely restricted to trade and immigration issues. Immigration was treated more seriously by the Americans: the "flood of low, unskilled, ignorant, foreign labor," as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts put it in 1896, represented a threat to the WASP values of the new world giant. Attempts were made to introduce federal restrictions on immigration — the Chinese were in fact banned for ten years as of 1882. Diplomatic efforts were also made to persuade the various source countries to discourage emigration. Meanwhile, acting against the wishes of their government, American agents continued to recruit workers for America's mines and factories in the Danube basin. Emigration presented problems for Vienna and dilemmas — as well as opportunities — for Budapest. Vienna did not want to see young men leaving the country, taking out American citizenship, returning home and settling down permanently in the land of the Habsburgs — and thus avoiding military service in the Imperial and Royal Army. Budapest
viewed emigration, in particular the departure of non-Magyar masses from Hungary, differently. The Hungarians, who made up barely half the population of the Kingdom of Hungary, saw in such emigration an excellent opportunity for the peaceful modification of their country's "ethnic balance" — and the partial solving of the problem of poverty. Washington and Vienna failed to find a satisfactory solution for the problem of overseas migration, although in 1906 and 1907 two acts of Congress made the withdrawal of American citizenship possible from individuals who took up permanent residence outside the United States.²

Trade proved to be a less important issue, since Austria-Hungary played a rather limited role in the transatlantic movement of commodities. Indicative not only of the volume and nature of trade but also of the general scope of relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary, the 1906 volume of the Foreign Relations series devotes nine pages to the relationship and lists the following four issues of concern: (1) Restrictions against the importation of beef from non-European countries; (2) the enforcement of "autonomous customs tariffs and commercial treaties;” (3) "franchise reform in Austria;” and (4) immigration related issues.³ Prior to World War I neither side attached much significance to cultivating relations with the other. But the war changed all that.

Vienna continued to be a rather unpopular diplomatic post among American politicians in the 1910s, and it took President Wilson more than six months to find an Ambassador to Vienna in Frederick Courtland Penfield who spoke neither German nor Hungarian and was more interested in Turkey than in Central Europe. The Sarajevo assassination and the outbreak of the war shifted attention to Vienna for a while, and Wilson went as far as to offer, in vain, of course, mediation between Austria and Serbia. By early 1915 ordinary neutral-belligerent relations were established and the Americans were asked to supervise the treatment of prisoners of war in both camps.⁴

The lack of genuine American neutrality soon brought about the most serious diplomatic confrontation ever between the two countries. After calling for strikes among Austro-Hungarian subjects working in American factories, Ambassador Constantin T. Dumba was declared persona non grata and was recalled in November 1915. Out of hurt pride, the Ballhausplatz refused to send a replacement ambassador until early 1917, by which time the Wilson administration had made up its mind about going to war, and so the Polish aristocrat Count Adam Tarnowski was not allowed to present his credentials. Following the American declaration of war on Germany in April 1917, the US declared war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917. Normal relations were never resumed because the Austro-Hungarian Empire ceased to exist even before peace
was made. Thus the prewar lack of interest on both sides was replaced by
desperate hostility only to end in American participation in the rearrange-
ment of the Danube basin. By the early 1920s the prewar lack of interest
on the American side had returned while Hungary looked upon the United
States as one possible promoter of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.5

Americans and Hungarians

Before the war no formal diplomatic relations existed between Washing-
ton and Budapest, simply because Hungary was not fully independent.
Under the circumstances American-Hungarian relations were conducted
within the broader framework of American–Austro-Hungarian relations.
Following the Compromise of 1867, the first American consulate was set
up in Budapest in 1878, and in 1904 President Roosevelt raised it to the
level of consulate general.6 By the coming of the war other consulates
were also opened, among others in Fiume, which monitored not only the
sailing of ships for the United States but also ethnic unrest in the southern
parts of the Monarchy. The only bilateral agreement we know of is an
obscure copyright agreement from 1912, which was "[m]ade necessary by
the requirements of Hungarian procedure and law."7

American-Hungarian relations before the war were thus confined
to symbolic gestures, mutual visits, immigration issues, and a couple of
strange diplomatic interludes, one involving a certain Marcus Braun and
immigration abuses, the other featuring President Roosevelt and Count
Apponyi and the Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905–06.

Symbolic gestures included the unveiling of the first Kossuth
statue in Cleveland in 1902 and the statue of Washington in Budapest in
1906. A minor Kossuth craze during the middle of the first decade of the
twentieth century was followed by President Roosevelt's decision to sign
the charter of the Hungarian Reformed Federation of America, and, in
broader terms, by the revival of the freedom-fighting image of the
Hungarians.8

Personal visits played an important role in shaping the mutual
images of the two nations. In a comprehensive study of Hungarian
travelogues of America between the Civil War and the turn of the cen-
tury, Anna Katona argues that "admiration mixed with disillusionment"
had come to replace the "admiration and wonder of early travelers."9
This tendency was not apparent in the public statements of prominent
Hungarians who visited the United States. In 1904, for example, a sizable
Hungarian delegation, featuring not only Apponyi but also the future
premier Count István Bethlen and his wife, attended the St. Louis confer-
ence of the Interparliamentary Union, and won recognition even in the
American press. Apponyi's next visit in 1911 was followed by two trips to the United States by Count Mihály Károlyi in 1914. Interestingly, this was by no means one-way traffic: in 1908 the prominent Democrat and three-time presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan paid a short visit to the Hungarian capital. Two years later, between a hunting trip in Africa and collecting the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway, former president Theodore Roosevelt paid a three-day visit to Hungary. This again was a major media event at the time, covered by Hungarian, American and Hungarian-American papers alike. One of Roosevelt's chief aims, of course, was to meet the dying Ferenc Kossuth, son of Lajos Kossuth, the foremost hero of the Hungarians living in America.10

Immigrants also influenced the American perception of Hungary and the Hungarians. It is common knowledge that during the "new immigration," between 400,000 to 600,000 Hungarians ended up in the United States. Actually many more were on the move, as re-migration figures were between 30 and 50 percent. This indicates that most Hungarians viewed the New World not as a possible new home but as an economic springboard: they intended to make some money and then return home, buy land, and live the rest of their lives back in Hungary. Consequently, they tried to make living in the United States as cheap as possible, often among appalling conditions, which, in turn, gave rise to strong nativist sentiments among the native-born Americans, who expected the immigrants to Americanize and become part of the melting pot. Securing proper working conditions and treatment for the immigrants gradually became a chief concern for the various Austro-Hungarian consulates in the United States.11

The first of the two diplomatic interludes, a rather delicate one from the Hungarian point of view, also concerned immigration matters. The American federal government had a tendency to employ foreign-born naturalized American citizens to monitor immigration and immigrants from their native country.12 One such person was a German-speaking Hungarian turned US citizen, Marcus Braun, who supported Theodore Roosevelt in his 1900 election campaign as chairman of the Hungarian republican Club of New York. In return for his services, he was appointed immigration inspector, and he took his job seriously. The Hungarian government launched a three-pronged program, the so-called American Action, to secure the loyalty of Hungarian immigrants in the United States. Braun found out about the program and, not without justification, interpreted it as interference with the domestic affairs of his adopted land. In a 1904 report he made his findings known to American authorities. During his next visit to Hungary a year later, he was arrested on the rather ridiculous charge that he had assaulted a detective in a hotel. While
the American ambassador to Vienna, Bellamy Storer, denied him the support he was entitled to as an American citizen and government agent, President Roosevelt intervened in his behalf and forced his release. Upon returning to the United States, Braun resigned, but was re-appointed by Roosevelt, who, in the meantime, recalled Ambassador Storer. In 1906 Braun published his own account of the affair as well as much of his report, highlighting one forgotten aspect of American-Hungarian relations:

Give no room to the immigrant — this is what I recommend in my reports — who, on settling here, is not absolutely free from the influences of his native land, ... and never forget that he probably never would have emigrated hither had his old home been willing to do for him as much as it does now, or attempts to do, or promises to do, for him now, when the danger of his expatriating himself for good stares into the face of the small peanut politicians of that native country of his.

Of course, hurt feelings prompted Braun to make some more outspoken remarks. However shocking and harsh these words may seem from a Hungarian, we must understand that Braun was one of the few (together with Joseph Pulitzer and Alexander Konta) who placed his adopted country before the one he had come from. This was, in part, the result of disappointment with Hungarian politics and politicians. Here is another telling example:

It is true that the imbecility, the corruption, the inefficiency, the shortsightedness, the rottenness of this very government forced that Magyar immigrant to put a mortgage on his old farm and sent him to the usurer... All interference with the immigrant must stop with the very moment he enters upon our soil. If, on his own volition and free will, he decides to go back to Austria-Hungary, ...he can go... But if, by artificial means... there be kept alive, not in the individual, but in the Magyar immigration as a class, an agitation to remain Magyars and not to become Americans... then, I say, the Hungarian government is guilty of violating our immigration laws; then, I say, these immigrants must be classed among those whom our laws declare to be undesirable and they must be excluded.

The overview of the other diplomatic interlude concerning the Hungarian constitutional crisis takes us into the third part of our survey, the case study of Count Apponyi and America.
Apponyi and America

Apponyi's relationship with America between his first contacts with Americans and the end of World War I breaks down into three periods. Between 1895, the first time he attended the annual conference of the Interparliamentary Union, and the outbreak of the Great War, he established and cultivated contacts with numerous Americans, visited the United States twice, organized the visits of prominent Americans to Hungary, and in his speeches in the States he courted the Hungarian-Americans. During the period of American neutrality, and especially in 1915, he functioned as the foremost spokesman of the Habsburg cause in America, and published four long articles in the *New York Times*. He was repeatedly rumoured as the new Habsburg ambassador to Washington, and the State Department sent a secret agent to seek his views of the war in late 1917. Finally, during the final stages of the war he lost contacts with America and his American friends, and returned as Hungary's international spokesman for territorial integrity in the immediate postwar period. In 1918, together with other prominent Hungarian politicians, he became the target of wild accusations and hate literature in the very medium he had used so successfully, on the pages of the *New York Times*.16

Apponyi first attended the Interparliamentary Union conference in Brussels in 1895 and soon became a regular Hungarian delegate. It was at these conferences that he met the first Americans, and his first real exposure to the New World was also the result of his work in the Union: he headed the Hungarian delegation to the St. Louis conference in 1904. By that time Apponyi had developed a pretty good command of English, helped by the fact that he had spent some of his holidays in London as a child and as a young man. In preparing for this trip he approached the American ambassador to Vienna, the aforementioned Bellamy Storer, to provide him with access to President Roosevelt. Storer and the Austrian ambassador in Washington, László Hengelmüller, did their best, and Roosevelt agreed to met the Count. They were equally impressed by each other, and the president invited Apponyi for another visit before he left the States. This was the start of a long and interesting friendship that would only be terminated by the war. Indicative of Roosevelt's appreciation for Apponyi was the fact that both meetings took place in September, during the final stages of the 1904 presidential election campaign.17

Apponyi then took an active part in the events leading to the constitutional crisis of 1905-06, especially in the debate about military policy, and then served as Minister for Education and Religion in the Independent Coalition. It was during his tenure of office that the second
diplomatic interlude between the United States and Hungary took place. Roosevelt viewed the events in Hungary with some concern, and revived his contacts with Apponyi by writing him privately. He suggested that the Hungarians should work towards the maintenance of the unity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and urged his friend to be patient and cautious. In a six-page reply dated June 6, Apponyi argued that a temporary armistice existed between the Emperor and the nation, and that Hungary’s growing economic independence was a thorn in the side of the Austrian government. He accused Hungary’s enemies in Vienna with manipulating and misleading western diplomats, and asked Roosevelt to instruct his ambassador, Charles Spencer Francis, to contact him in secret. He also invited Roosevelt’s daughter, Alice, and her husband, who then were in Europe, to Hungary. The president first wrote to his daughter and advised her not to visit Austria-Hungary, or to visit both Vienna and Budapest, and “listen smilingly to anything that anyone, from an Austrian archduke to a Hungarian count, says about the politics of the dual empire, but, as I need hardly add, make no comment thereon yourselves.” He then instructed Francis to contact Apponyi and any other Hungarian politicians Apponyi recommends. He also issued a warning to his chief representative in Vienna: “Of course in talking to these Hungarians do not express any opinion yourself on the internal affairs of the dual empire, but listen attentively to what they have to say and write it to me... I need not say to you that this is a mission in which you will need to show great tact, judgment and discretion in doing what I have here outlined.” Finally, he wrote to Apponyi again. In this letter he told Apponyi of his decision to instruct Francis to get in touch with him. Roosevelt called himself a friend of both Austria and Hungary, and asked for caution and consideration again: “it is a very serious thing to jeopardize a sure though slow success for the sake of a possible increased rapidity of movement.” Wait is the watchword, for

[T]he situation changes to your advantage. Surely under such conditions, no matter what may be the argument of abstract justice, it is worth while to pay some heed to an intelligent and proper expediency, and while hastening forward as far as possible the footsteps of Fate, which are now pointed in your direction, yet to strive to prevent any violent rupture; for aside from all other considerations there will always be the possibility of disaster in such rupture, no matter how small this possibility was.
There is no way to measure Roosevelt's actual influence on Apponyi, but it is fair to say that the president of the United States was applying a lot of pressure on a member of the Hungarian cabinet in the conflict between Vienna and Budapest for the maintenance of the unity of the empire, without informing either the emperor or the Ballhausplatz.

The failure of the Independence Coalition prompted Apponyi to rejoin the opposition in Hungary's Parliament, but he was glad to welcome in Hungary first William Jennings Bryan, and then Roosevelt and his son, Kermit. En route from Vienna to Budapest, Roosevelt spent a whole day at the Apponyi estate in Eberhárd, before arriving in the Hungarian capital. In Eberhárd, and then a year later at the Roosevelt Family estate in New York, Oyster Bay, they discussed the rising international tensions and Apponyi proposed to publish articles in American papers to counteract the anti-Hungarian propaganda he encountered at the Union conferences and in the western papers. The correspondence between the two men continued undisturbed even after the outbreak of the war, but Roosevelt cut it off, on June 1, 1915, in response to a New York Times article and private letter from Apponyi about the sinking, by a German submarine, of the British ocean-liner, the Lusitania.

The outbreak of the Great War created an entirely new situation for Apponyi: he now hoped to win the support of the American public for Austria-Hungary at a time when the United States was gradually moving toward the abandonment of neutrality. Owing to the contacts he had established before the war, no less than four of his longer articles were printed by the New York Times in 1915, which made him the most successful of the Central Powers propagandists in the United States — without actually revisiting the New World.

The first two pieces were printed on the same day, January 17, 1915, in the Sunday magazine section. This was due to a strange coincidence: he sent an article to the Hungarian-American banker Alexander Konta for publication in the Times, and another one to Roosevelt for The Outlook, a weekly that the former president used to edit before the war. Since Roosevelt refused to help placing the second piece, Apponyi asked him to forward it to Konta. The banker in turn used his considerable influence and placed both articles in the same issue. One of the two articles was actually an open letter addressed to Nicholas Murray Butler of New York, who later served as president of Columbia University. Apponyi argued that the war had long been planned by Russia against Austria-Hungary, and that Britain and France willingly joined in, using the German violation of Belgian neutrality as a cheap excuse.

On March 28, 1915, he published another open letter addressed to Butler. In this piece Apponyi discussed the lack of genuine American
neutrality in the conflict. He began with the contraband issue and pointed out in no uncertain words that it would destroy America's credibility as mediator in the long run. He then went on to discuss Butler's theory of a "war between democracy and autocracy," and challenged the American's perception of a uniformly democratic allied camp. In all fairness to both, Apponyi acknowledged the fact that Butler described Russia's presence in the allied camp as an "anomaly," but went on to repeat his earlier statement that this was a Russian war: "I must repeat it over and over again: it is in origin a Russian war, with a clearly outlined Russian program of conquest." Repeating in part one of his speeches from 1911, when he was invited to lecture in the United States by the Civic Forum of New York City, he cleverly raised the issue of a postwar "western coalition" including the Central Powers as well as the United States, but excluding Russia. Interestingly enough, he maintained that the "yellow peril" from China and Japan would sooner or later force Russia to seek admission into this western coalition." Apparently, a democratic Russia did have a place in Apponyi's vision of the postwar world.

His final piece in the New York Times came after his break with Roosevelt, on October 12, 1915, and was addressed to an unidentified Mr. Allen, a "member of the World Peace Foundation." He repeated many of his earlier arguments about Russia and the lack of American neutrality, but this time with surprising passion: "How on earth can you say that France and England are fighting for those principles which America upholds, when these two powers are in alliance with Russia?" His disappointment with America was also apparent: "... the manifest unfairness of her so-called neutrality has unfitted America to act as a peacemaker." These words were harsh enough, but he hit the wrong nerve in the crescendo:

What are the few hundred who went down with the Lusitania, deeply though we mourn their lot, in comparison to the hundreds of thousands who are killed by American bullets fired by Russians from American guns, by American explosives, a token of sympathy offered by a peace-loving democracy to the representative of darkest tyranny and wanton aggression?

On occasion Apponyi was criticized for his pro-German views, but in September, 1916, he had not trouble making it to the front page of the New York Times with the telling headline, "America the Nation to Bring About Peace, Count Apponyi Tells Hungarian Parliament." He was "promoted" to the post of "former Hungarian prime minister," which he never was, and the article's American author seriously expected that he
would see to it that the disgraced Dumba would be replaced some time in 1916. The appearance of this article, and its tone, indicated that Apponyi's prestige in America, built up before the war, remained as high as ever, despite his break with Roosevelt, his many awkward remarks, and the occasional bad review.26

An abortive attempt by the State Department to contact him through a secret agent in November, 1917, sheds light not only on how highly the Americans continued to think of Apponyi but also on the very peculiar relationship that existed between President Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing. As of February 1917, the official American policy was to try to negotiate Austria-Hungary out of the war, and thus break up the German Mitteleuropa plan. The success of such negotiations would have doomed the war effort of the Central Powers, would have brought the war to an early end, and would have forestalled the possible loss of tens of thousands of American lives. To further these efforts, Lansing, without consulting his boss, sent a private representative, Frank E. Anderson, to meet Apponyi in Vienna and seek out the Count's views about a possible Austro-Hungarian defection from the war. However, the American declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in early December 1917, rendered Anderson's mission well-nigh impossible. Accordingly, Anderson was next instructed to stay in Bern and invite Apponyi there. Instead of proceeding to Switzerland and staying there, however, Anderson secured a safe conduct for himself and travelled to Vienna to consult Apponyi there, as well as Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. Neither Apponyi nor Czernin was willing to consider a separate peace. In the end then, Anderson managed to embarrass his boss without achieving anything. When in April of next year he returned to the United States, Lansing had to deny publicly any contact between Anderson and the State Department. This abortive peace overture, besides showing that the Americans mistakenly believed that Apponyi was among the key decision-makers in Vienna, indicates that Lansing tended to act without consulting his President and reveals the fact that Wilson failed to inform in advance his own Secretary of State of his plan to ask for a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in his annual message to Congress in early December.27

The year 1918 brought mainly trouble for Apponyi and Hungary. This was the year when Apponyi lost his contacts with America. It was also the time when the fairly positive pre-war image of Hungary in the American press was reversed, mostly as the result of the successful propaganda of Czech and other Slav lobbyists such as Tomáš G. Masaryk. President Wilson's fourteen points, and especially the tenth, had given new hope and new energy to Masaryk and other propagandists favouring
the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. It was under these circumstances that, on February 10, 1918, the New York Times printed a lengthy interview with two Czech activists, G. H. Mika and Charles Pergler of the Czech-Slav Press Bureau, who openly challenged Wilson's decision to help maintain the unity of the Habsburg empire. They claimed that the Slavs of the Monarchy would refuse to settle for anything short of independence. On March 17, the paper printed the first open attack on the President's pro-Habsburg unity stance by a Rumanian lobbyist by the name of K. Bercovici. In a short piece titled "Hungarian Lust for World Power," he castigated Hungarian history as a never ending quest for domination in the Balkans and the Near East. His description of the I Hungarians was uniquely harsh even in terms of World War I hate literature:

The cruelty and intolerance of the Magyars is as proverbial in the Balkans as is their arrogance and stupidity. Long of arms, bow-legged, with fierce mouth and deep-seated, small eyes, the Magyar is the typical savage of history. Like his brother, the Teuton, he is an abject slave and a horrible master.

The growing anti-Habsburg and anti-Hungarian sentiments, together with Wilson's great turn-around in the matter of Austria-Hungary's dismemberment in the summer of 1918, brought about a revision of the American perception of Apponyi, too. A New York Times editorial bearing the headline "Arch-Magyars," dated October 28, 1918, had a go not only at the Hungarian statesmen István Tisza, Stefan (István) Burian and Gyula Andrássy, Jr., but also at Apponyi:

Apponyi is the too notorious Minister of Education who shut up the Serbian schools, who prohibited the reopening of the Rumanian teachers' training colleges, whose "aim is to strengthen everywhere the national Magyar State," who in ecclesiastical and educational questions seeks by all means and without scruple to Magyarize.

The unidentified author then summed up his views as follows: "Wild is the folly that sets up hunkers like Andrássy and Apponyi in the agony of decrepit states." Gone were the times when Apponyi was presented to the American public as a prominent elder statesman and Roosevelt called him "my dear Count Apponyi."

The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1918-1919 presented Apponyi
with a new set of problems and responsibilities. Problems, since his Eberhárd estate had become part of the new Czecho-Slovak Republic, and responsibilities in the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League and in the peace preparations. He then led the Hungarian peace delegation to Paris in 1920 but this is a different, and quite well-known, story.

Conclusions: Evolving Mutual Images

The traditional image of a freedom-fighting Hungary — inhabited by merry noblemen fond of wine, women and song — may not have been the only one in the United States before the war, but it was definitely the dominant one. Interestingly enough, lack of interest prevailed over Hungarian government interference in the domestic affairs of the United States and the arrest of Braun in Budapest. Nor did the way of life led by the Hungarians in America change American perceptions of Hungary. Unlike in Britain and France, the positive image of Hungary survived well into the final year of the war, when it became publicly challenged by Slav (as well as British and French) propagandists, who wanted to secure American support for their territorial ambitions in the Danube basin. American interest in Hungary died away after the signing of the separate peace in 1921, and this gave room for the Hungarians in America to revive the Kossuth image. This was done most successfully in 1928, when a Kossuth statue was erected on the Hudson River, on the campus of Columbia University.

America's image as the "promised land" was never seriously challenged in Hungary between the turn-of-the-century and the end of the Great War. Initially, Hungarians migrated to America hoping to make a better living there, or afterwards back home, and Hungarian politicians developed a tendency to court not only the American public but also the Hungarian Americans. Count Albert Apponyi played an all-important part in this quest, and his letters to Roosevelt prove that it was a conscious effort on his part. Hungarian politicians grew more and more disappointed with America during the early stages of the war because of the lack of genuine American neutrality, but the underlying admiration of the Hungarian public for the greatest democratic experiment in human history prevailed over this disappointment. Apponyi, Károlyi, and in the final stages of the war, even Andrássy came to view the New World as the only possible source of a fair peace. And despite the emotional charges that Trianon was a joint Franco-American "attempt at genocide," it is more fair to say that American diplomats were simply unable to cope with the difficulties of peacemaking in Paris. After the war the United States became the target of a new Hungarian propaganda campaign, the
aim of which was to win international support, first for economic recovery and then for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

NOTES

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2 This account is based on: Gerald H. Davis, "The Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary, 1913–1917" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1958); Julianna Puskás, Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880-1940 [Immigrant Hungarians in the United States] (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1982); and Steven Bela Vardy, The Hungarian-Americans (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985).


5 Giant, Through the Prism, 7.


7 Giant, Through the Prism, 35.


10 This account is based on Giant, Through the Prism, and Tibor Giant, "Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia" [Roosevelt, Apponyi and the Habsburg Monarchy], in Századok 131/6 (1997), 1386-1401. For details in English see the translation of the relevant Pesti Hírlap article on the internet: "Roosevelt at Budapest," www2.tlc.ttu.edu/kelly/Archive/TR/PH42010.htm.


Ibid., 133-34.

The following survey is based on Glant, Through the Prism and "Apponyi, Roosevelt:"

Kende, Magyarok Amerikában, 2: 452-61; Count Albert Apponyi, The Memoirs of Count Apponyi (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 157-67; József Kerekesázy, Apponyi (Budapest: Singer és Wolfner, 1943), 117-32. All correspondence cited below is from the Roosevelt Papers in the Library of Congress (hereafter LC). Apponyi’s papers were confiscated by communist authorities in the 1950s and we have not been able to locate them.

Roosevelt to Apponyi, April 27, 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

Apponyi to Roosevelt, June 6, 1906, loc. cit.


Roosevelt to Apponyi, July 10, 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LC.


Glant, “Apponyi, Roosevelt,” 1393-95. After the break initiated by Roosevelt they never got to meet again, because Roosevelt died in January 1919. The article mentioned here was printed on October 12, and is discussed below.

Apponyi to Roosevelt, September 17 and October 24, 1914, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

Glant, Through the Prism, 108-09.

Glant, Through the Prism, 71-72, and 57-58.

Tisza (1861-1918) was arguably the most prominent Hungarian politician before and during the war. He served as prime minister of Hungary in 1903-05 and 1913-17. Burian (1851-1922) served as joint Austro-Hungarian foreign minister twice during the war, and was a close friend of Tisza. Andrássy (1860-1929) was the son of the man who forged the Austro-German alliance, and he too served as joint foreign minister during the final stages of the war.


Glant, Through the Prism, 36-40.